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ABSTRACT 
The Open Method of Coordination has since its inauguration in 2000 rocketed into the high politics 
of EU-policy making and has been embraced by both politicians and scholars for its potential to 
further Europe into a more socially oriented integration. However, while the method has been 
praised as a breath of fresh air in EU policy-making it is remarkable how empirically unexplored its 
real life operation is. This thesis focuses on actor’s perceptions of the OMC on Social Protection 
and Social Inclusion (OMC/SPSI) in Sweden. Through a qualitative approach, based on interviews 
with stakeholders in the national OMC/SPSI process it is argued that while the method have had a 
potential impact as a leverage for actor inclusion in policy discussions perfections among actors 
portray the method as a rather illegitimate and ineffective method constructing a more socially 
oriented Europe. 
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European integration, Legitimacy, Effectiveness, Democracy, Europeanization, Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   3 
 
 
ABBREVATIONS 
 
BEPG – Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
CU – Committee of Users 
EAPN – European Anti-Poverty Network 
EEC – European Economic Community 
EES – European Employment Strategy 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
NAP – National Action Plan 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
NMU – Network Against Exclusion 
NSR – National Strategy Report 
OMC - Open Method of Coordination 
OMC/SPSI – Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
SKL – Swedish Association of Regions and County councils 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   4 
CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................5 
1.1 Purpose ...............................................................................................................................................................7 
1.2 Disposition..........................................................................................................................................................7 
2. THEORIZING THE OMC ...................................................................................................................8 
2.1 The OMC and ‘governance’ ..........................................................................................................................8 
2.2 The OMC and ‘Europeanization’.................................................................................................................9 
2.3 Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Focal points debate and research ...................................................... 13 
2.3.1 What’s the problem with the OMC? .................................................................................................................. 13 
2.3.2 Legitimacy................................................................................................................................................................... 15 
2.3.3 Effectiveness .............................................................................................................................................................. 18 
2.4 The OMC/SPSI in Sweden .......................................................................................................................... 21 
2.4.1 Sweden as a political and organizational culture ........................................................................................... 21 
2.4.2 Introducing the OMC in Sweden ......................................................................................................................... 22 
2.5 Analytical assumptions and why perceptions matter............................................................................ 23 
2.5.1 Why perceptions matter .......................................................................................................................................... 23 
3. METHOD............................................................................................................................................... 24 
3.1 Research design and choice of respondents............................................................................................. 24 
3.2 Analysis and caveats ..................................................................................................................................... 25 
4. RESULTS............................................................................................................................................... 26 
4.1 Legitimacy....................................................................................................................................................... 27 
4.2 Effectiveness ................................................................................................................................................... 29 
5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................... 33 
5.1 Questions for further research of the OMC in action ........................................................................... 36 
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................................... 39 
Appendix 1 - Interview guide NGOs .................................................................................................... 46 
Appendix 2 – Interview guide public officials .................................................................................... 47 
Appendix 3 – Swedish summary………………………………………………………………….48 
   5 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Through the Lisbon Summit in March 2000, Europe was in a ten-year perspective set on the course 
to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy … with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion’. Except the creation of a Social Agenda1, one of the major 
achievements of the summit was the clear formulation of a ‘new’ approach coordinating social 
policy in the European Union (EU). The Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC), originating from 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the European Employment Strategy (EES), is 
the EU’s latest policy-making tool representing the “methodical backbone” of the Lisbon Strategy 
in the attempt to realize a ‘European Social Model’ (Zeitlin 2008: 1; Heidenreich & Bischoff 2008: 
499 (quotation)). Its main purpose is to orient Member State’s policies toward common strategic 
goals and develop a shared framework for economic and social policy recalibration in an era of 
increasing economic competition and fiscal austerity (Ferrera & Sacchi 2005: 137; Pierson 1998). 
The method can be seen as part of the ideas behind the ambitious ‘re-launching of Europe’, which 
during the 1990s resulted in, what Streeck (1996) has called a ‘neo-voluntaristic’ approach to 
European integration – an approach representing a shift from harmonization to co-ordination of 
social policy. Associated with the rise of ‘New Modes of Governance’ in EU policy-making the 
OMC can also be seen as part of a response to the Community Method’s ineptness accommodating 
the diversity of Member State’s institutional arrangements reconciling European objectives with 
(sub-)national preferences (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006: 36; Smismans 2004: 16). 
Consequently, in contrast to the social policy initiatives of the EEC, which rather unsuccessfully 
attempted to establish supranational social rights and obligations (Community method/‘hard law’), 
the construction of ‘Social Europe’ in the European Union give Member States greater 
responsibility to interpret and implement social policy at national level without the threat of legal 
sanctions in case of non-conformity (‘soft law’) (Scott & Trubek 2002). Thus, through an iterative 
cyclical reporting process (Member states responding to the Commission’s recommendations 
through so called National Strategy Reports2) domestic social policy is exposed to monitoring, peer 
review and benchmarking which over time aims at enhancing mutual learning processes (Borras & 
                                                        1 Also referred to as the Lisbon Agenda or the Lisbon Strategy. 
2 Formerly referred to as National Action Plans (NAP).  
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Jacobsson 2004: 188). By including the entire spectrum of the European multi-level polity3, 
potentially pooling knowledge from an array of different actors, the OMC also attempts to enhance 
new and innovate policy solutions while simultaneously respecting the principle of subsidiarity, 
thus potentially balancing the thin line between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism – a 
theoretical quality often accentuated by its advocates describing it as a ‘third way’ in EU-policy 
making (Zeitlin 2005: 4; Larsson 2001). This inclusive ambition has also aspired as a potential 
antidote against the Union’s perceived ‘democratic deficit’ effectively reducing the gap between 
political elites and European ‘citizens’ creating a more deliberate and transparent EU. Thus, 
perceived as a “breath of fresh air” in the often opaque landscape of EU policy-making (Borras & 
Jacobsson 2004: 187), open coordination has spread (and is spreading) swiftly across policy fields 
beyond employment and is now applied in areas such as social inclusion, pensions, research and 
development, education, immigration etc. - fields in which the EU’s constitutional competences are 
weak or non-existent (Pochet 2005; Goetschy 2001: 402; Radaelli 2003; Kröger 2007; Citi & 
Rhodes 2007). 
 
The OMC’s rocketing political career has caught the attention of many scholars resulting in a 
bourgeoning body of literature. Lively debates have aroused concerning its implications for 
European integration. While some scholars distinguish it as a promising policy-making instrument 
potentially bridging Member State’s deep-rooted policy legacies in the creation of ‘Social Europe’ 
(Vanderbroucke 2001), some of the more critical accounts simply perceive it as an “innocuous 
exercise in Euro-Verbosity” (Alesina & Perotti 2004: 8). A central matter of controversy, feeding 
the ongoing debate, concerns the absence of empirical accounts of the OMC ‘in action’4 where 
much of the literature, until recently, have biased a theoretical and often normative approach. Thus, 
while the OMC in its infancy was embraced by many scholars5 for its novel and experimentalist 
approach to EU policy-making, few have been able to provide any ‘hard facts’ in favour of its real-
life operation. In its quality of ‘soft-law’ (i.e. not constituting a legal framework onto which policies 
necessarily conform), the OMC has been recognized as a notoriously slippery object of research for 
a number of interrelated reasons. First, the varying dynamics and impact of different OMC                                                         3 According to the Lisbon Conclusions, the OMC is “a fully decentralised approach…applied in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity in which the union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and 
civil society, will be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership” (Paragraph 37 European Council 
Conclusion 2000). 
4 However, for two empirically oriented accounts see Zeitlin, Pochet & Magnusson (ed.) (2005) and Heidenreich & 
Zeitlin (ed.) (2009). 
5 Scholars who more often than not were included in the actual development of the method acting as experts (e.g. 
Vanderbroucke (2001)). 
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processes makes it difficult to draw general conclusion about the method. Second, although the 
process has been around for more than a decade, in a comparative perspective, it is relatively new 
which makes it difficult to draw any but tentative conclusions. Third, the horizontal and vertical 
complexity of different OMC processes integrating several policy domains and including an array 
of actors in the European multi-level polity engaging on a formal as well as informal basis makes 
the ‘tracking’ of influence an intricate exercise. Fourth, the non-coercive/non-binding character of 
OMC processes where establishing evidence of causal impact between EU and (sub-)national level 
can be seen as somewhat of a daunting task (Zeitlin 2005: 26). Fifth, since the empirical research on 
the OMC is still in its infancy the absence of reliable variables and analytical frameworks through 
which to assess the method’s potential impact makes research of the OMC problematic and has 
been a matter of recent discussion (Citi & Rhodes 2007; Kröger 2009b et al.). While recent studies 
have provided empirically oriented and to a larger extent more critical accounts a notion of the 
method as somewhat of an ‘unidentified political object’ still prevails (Zeitlin 2005). Thus, it seems 
important to fill the empirical gap in the study of the OMC in order to identify the ways it ‘matter’, 
or not, in the ongoing process of European integration. 
1.1 Purpose 
The focus of this study is domestic actor’s perceptions of the OMC on Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion’s (OMC/SPSI)6 legitimacy and effectiveness as a policy-making instrument in Sweden. 
The study should be seen as a contribution to the ‘empirical turn’ (Borras & Conzelmann 2007) in 
the study of the OMC evaluating its potential as a policy-instrument for the construction of a more 
socially oriented Europe. 
 
1.2 Disposition 
The following chapter positions the OMC in relation to theories of European integration and 
introduces the reader to the debates and research concerning both the method’s legitimacy as an 
instrument as well as its practical effectiveness. The third section presents the study’s 
methodological approach. The fourth chapter provides an account for the main findings of the 
study. The fifth part discusses the findings in relation to the ongoing debate on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
modes of governance in European integration. 
                                                        
6 The OMC on Social inclusion was ‘streamlined’ with the OMC on Social Protection in 2006 and is now referred to as 
the OMC on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (OMC/SPSI) (see CEC, 2005).  
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2. THEORIZING THE OMC 
2.1 The OMC and ‘governance’ 
Much of the OMC-literature falls under the so called governance approach in EU-studies (Pollack 
2005: 36). Emerging during the 1990s, the governance approach detach itself from the ‘grand 
theorizing’ found in classical integration theory and instead encompasses a cluster of mid-range 
theories that share some conceptions, assumptions and research strategies (Hix 1998). Thus, broadly 
speaking, the governance approach in EU-studies is concerned with three general dimensions of 
European integration: 1) the question of the possibilities of democratic and legitimate governance 
beyond the nation state 2) the problem-solving capacity of national systems of governance and their 
transformations by Europeanization 3) the political conflict as a result of the insertion of national 
systems of rules into a European political system (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 257-8).  
 
However, before engaging in the European strand of the governance literature a general definition 
of ‘governance’ should be provided. Thus, the term governance is somewhat of a blurred concept 
with a range of different definitions7. Rhodes (1996:660) offers an encompassing account of the 
concept listing four shared characteristics: 
1. Interdependence between organizations meaning that governance is broader than government 
covering non-state actors thus blurring the boundaries between public, private and voluntary 
sector. 
2. Continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange 
resources and negotiate shared purposes. 
3. Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and 
agreed by network participants. 
4. A significant amount of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state: 
they are self-organizing. Although the state does not occupy a privileged sovereign position 
it can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks. 
 
Thus, the notion of governance, according to Rhodes (1996), indicates a change of how society is 
governed where the state no longer possess monopoly of power but where political reality, to a                                                         7 See e.g. Rhodes (1996:653) who identifies six different uses of the term: 1) the minimal state 2) corporate governance 
3) the new public management 4) ‘good governance’ 5) socio-cybernetic systems 6) self-organizing networks. 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larger extent, is negotiated between public and private actors in a given political arena. This 
complex process de-monopolizing the state’s competencies can be explained through an array of 
interrelated processes associated with more or less blurry concepts such as globalization and the 
internationalization of politics, regionalization, the ‘crisis’ of the welfare state, the rise of neo-
liberalism, New Public Management and the privatization of public services etc. (Rosamond 1998). 
The EU has been recognized as a significant actor in these ongoing processes fragmenting the 
state’s sovereignty where increased market integration (e.g. Single European Market), supranational 
regulation (ECJ) and extensive regional and non-state funding (e.g. Regional Fund, Social Fund, the 
Commission’s funding of the European Social Platform etc.) can be seen as contributing to a 
increasingly complex and dispersed system of governance.  
 
Thus, while governance appears to be a fuzzy concept, within EU-studies is often claimed to be a 
sui generis where the EU is perceived as a de-centred, non-hierarchical multi-level polity inhabited 
by an array of public and private actors engaging in deliberation (Hix 1998:38-9). In this view, the 
European polity is seen as a political system of ‘governance without government’ in which 
deliberative and collective problem-solving is seen as a normatively superior form of policy-
making. Thus, the EU emerges as a potential ‘deliberative democracy’ in which actors engage in 
problem-solving beyond the reach of the nation state blurring the clear-cut distinction between the 
international and domestic systems (Pollack 2005: 36; Jachtenfuchs 2001: 258; Kohler-Koch 1996). 
Hence, the relation between the EU-and the domestic arena has been a central point of research. 
 
2.2 The OMC and ‘Europeanization’ 
The term ‘Europeanization’ has no shared definition or stable meaning where scholars have 
questioned its usefulness as an encompassing concept (Olsen 2002). However, broadly speaking it 
has been conceived as “the reorientation or reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that 
reflect policies, practices or preferences advanced through the EU system of governance” (Bache & 
Jordan 2006: 30). The Europeanization literature is dominated by two alternative explanatory 
perspectives deriving from rational-choice theory on the one hand, and social constructivism on the 
other. These two perspectives (in the Europeanization literature often referred to as rationalist and 
constructivist perspectives) are often presented in a polarized way highlighting different ways 
whereby the EU may influence the domestic political sphere (Pollack 2005: 40). Rationalists see 
power as a zero-sum game where actor’s interests are fixed and mechanisms of Europeanization is 
mediated by the redistribution of power resources. Constructivists perceive power as a positive-sum 
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interaction where interests are malleable and Europeanization is brought about through 
socialization/learning (see Table 2.2 in Bache 2008: 13). The two perspectives are not seen as 
mutually exclusive but often occur simultaneously and characterize different aspects of adaptational 
change (Börzel & Risse 2000: 2).  
 
A general notion in the Europeanization literature is that the likeliness of change or adjustment of 
the domestic arena correlates with institutional and/or political preconditions. According to Börzel 
and Risse (2000), two conditions for expecting domestic change as a response to Europeanization 
exist: 1) a certain degree of ‘misfit’ between European-level processes, policies and institutions and 
domestic-level processes, policies and institutions (often referred to as ‘goodness of fit’ (see Duina 
1997)) 2) some facilitating factors, either in the form of actors and/or institutions, who/which 
respond to adaptational pressures. The degree of fit/misfit is seen as a precondition, but not a 
sufficient condition, for change (p. 1). Furthermore, the authors use the rationalist-constructivist 
divide8 to emphasize different mediating factors of Europeanization. Thus, through a rationalist 
view Europeanization provides actors with new opportunities which can, depending on the capacity 
of actor’s to use opportunities and avoid constraints, lead to a redistribution of power in the 
domestic sphere. However two mediating factors, exerting opposite effects influence actors capacity 
to make use of opportunities: 1) multiple veto points in the domestic political structure, i.e. the 
ability of a political system to resist/reject change 2) formal institutions providing actors with 
resources (strategic or cognitive) to bring about change. In the constructivist view, policies, norms 
and collective understandings exert adaptational pressures that may lead to the internalization of 
new norms and identities. Two mediating factors are emphasized: 1) the role of norm entrepreneurs 
as ‘change agents’ persuading other actors to redefine preferences and identities 2) the political 
culture and other informal institutions contributing to consensus-building and cost-sharing (p. 1-2). 
Drawing on this categorization Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001 derive five mediating factors: 1) 
multiple veto-points 2) facilitating institutions 3) political and organizational cultures 4) the 
differential empowerments of domestic actors 5) learning. A sixth factor, 6) political or partisan 
contestation is added by Bache (2008: 16), which relates to the political dynamics of 
Europeanization. The figure below (2.1) envisage this dynamic. 
 
                                                        
8 Börzel and Risse (2000) refer to these categories as ‘rationalist institutionalism’ and ‘sociological institutionalism’. 
However, they will be referred to in this thesis as rationalist and constructivist perspectives. 
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Figure 2.1.1 Europeanization and domestic change 
Modification of Bache (2008: 17)9 
 
However, important to note (as the authors acknowledge), this analytical framework is restricted to 
a top-down, one-way perspective and does not incorporate the way in which actors in the domestic 
political arena may overcome, manipulate or even use a misfit (Börzel & Risse 2000). As 
Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006) argues, the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis is too deterministic meaning 
that it is apolitical, presuming that governments want to remain the status quo. Thus, according to 
the authors, national policy-makers and politicians may use a fit/misfit as leverage realizing radical 
reforms (p. 337). The authors exemplify this through a number of examples where Member States 
have reacted in total dissonance with the thesis of fit/misfit10. Thus, they argue for a bottom-up 
perspective placing domestic politics on the center stage of the study of European influence (p. 
347). This is an important aspect and as Kohler-Koch (1996: 368) points out, “National 
administrators make frequent strategic use of the paradoxical logic of self-commitment in a 'two 
level game'. At the European level, a government may turn its weakness, in terms of being 
dependent on domestic pressures, into strength by blackmailing its European negotiating partners. 
In turn, being interested in a European compromise, domestic interests may be rejected” 
(References removed by author). Thus, in the case of the OMC, as Büchs (2008) argues, national 
administrations as well as NGOs may use the OMC in a strategy of ‘invited dutifulness’ where 
actors “can try to lobby the EU Commission and influence the OMC agenda in order to provide 
themselves with an additional reform lever ‘at home’ ” (p. 20). The OMC can thus be used 
selectively by domestic actors ‘uploading’ their preferences to form the agenda contributing to the                                                         
9 In Bache’s version the last box contains a typology (Type I and Type II Multi-level governance) which is not of 
central relevance for my study. Thus, I have left this out. 
10 For example, the Netherlands highly resisting a Commission directive on liberalizing the national gas-market while 
suddenly, after a domestic political change of government, the Netherlands suddenly became an advocate for the 
directive. 
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construction of the policy-blueprints. By subsequently ‘credit claiming’ or ‘blaming’ the OMC, 
actors may use the method to justify reforms/status quo of national policies (Ibid).  
 
Another important aspect of this complex interaction, often implicitly indicated but seldom defined, 
is the ways in which actors ‘make use’ of EU politics/processes. Jacquot & Woll (2003, 2010) 
define this notion of ‘political usage’ as “social practices that seize the European Union as a set of 
opportunities, be they institutional, ideological, political or organizational” (2003: 9). By focusing 
on intentional actions the authors nuances, what they se as the reductionist perspective in rational 
choice. They argue that “Resources and constraints are a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
strategic behavior. They are only contextual element that usages are based on; actors intentionally 
transform them into political practices in order to reach their goals. Making use of something 
implies voluntary action and thus intended meaning, but conscious and voluntary action does not 
mean that the final outcome is identical to the initial objective, as the effects of an action are often 
not entirely predictable or controllable. As strategic as usages may be initially, in the long run, it 
entails cognitive and/or normative adaptation by actors and their political environment, which in 
turn affects their subsequent behavior and positioning” (2010: 116). Thus, neither ‘uploading’ nor 
‘downloading’ is perfect and the outcome is far from certain – an important point that highlights the 
limits of the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis and emphasizes the complexity associated with multi-level 
interactions. Finally, as Pierson (2000: 252) argues, even though transformations may occur these 
are bound to be ‘path-dependent’. This is so, according to the author, since “preceding steps in a 
particular direction induce further movement in the same direction…” where “the probability of 
further steps along that path increases with each move down that path”. Thus, the ‘increasing 
returns’ or ‘positive feedback’ associated with following a certain institutional-political path will 
increase the costs (mainly in the form of electoral loss) of deviating from it. In relation to 
Europeanization, this means that any influence ‘traveling’ from EU to Member States will be 
incorporated into the national system in ways that avoid costs. 
 
So, in sum, by acknowledging that the term Europeanization is indeed a complex and often disputed 
concept where the interaction between EU and national level should be seen as a reciprocal ‘two-
level’ game in which a range of actors make use of the process in different ways, both in attempts to 
affect the EU-level agenda as well as the domestic sphere and where radical change is associated 
with electoral loss, one should recognize the complexity in identifying the influence of the OMC 
where conclusions must be interpreted in the light of a range of intermediating processes.  
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2.3 Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Focal points debate and research 
While there exists a plethora of analyses and perspectives concerning the OMC’s implications for 
European integration, broadly speaking, two main focal points have arisen concerning the method’s 
1) legitimacy as a policy instrument and 2) effectiveness enhancing learning processes  (Kröger 
2009b: 4-5). While the two concepts are interrelated, i.e. legitimacy may enhance the effectiveness 
of a certain policy-outcome through comprehensive actor input and vice versa, the effectiveness of 
a policy may enhance legitimacy through its perceived output (Scharpf 2006). However, before 
engaging in the current research of the OMC’s legitimacy and effectiveness a brief review of the 
debates surrounding the method will be presented. 
 
2.3.1 What’s the problem with the OMC? 
The OMC has been subject of extensive debate. As indicated above, much of the controversy 
concerns the legitimacy and effectiveness of the method where the central points of discussion have 
surrounded the method’s political design as well as its actual policy content as associated with the 
Lisbon strategy. Three broad and interrelated issues have been raised: 1) the market oriented policy 
discourse propagated by the OMC 2) where it has been asserted that the design of the method may 
‘frame’ policy discourses leading to a reductionist perception of social policy 3) and where its 
‘soft’/‘experimentalist’ approach to policy-making may actually turn out to be less legitimate and 
effective than preceding approaches. 
 
Hence, the policy discourse of the OMC as incorporated in the Lisbon Strategy has been pointed out 
as highly market-oriented where scholars have recognized the method as continuously embedded in 
the EU’s ‘master discourse’ of competitiveness (Radaelli 2003: 7). For example, looking at the four 
pillars on which the EES rests: employability, adaptability, entrepreneurship, and gender equality, 
Streeck (1999)11 argues that the EU’s vision of a social dimension rests on a form of ‘supply-side 
egalitarianism’ where  “Equality of citizens is pursued, not through ex post political intervention in 
market outcomes, but through ex ante equalization of the resource endowments of market 
participants, especially their "human capital" and "employability"” – an agenda which reflects a 
neo-liberal orthodoxy in which ‘flexibility’ and ‘deregulation’ are seen as the panacea for reducing 
employment (Howell 2005). Furthermore, as Hansen and Schierup (2005) argues, the EU’s 
understanding (or rather the Commission’s spin on) of social exclusion should be seen as a severe 
dislocation of the concept’s original meaning as it emerged in the 1970’s. Thus while the original                                                         11 E-resource, available at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp99-8/wp99-8.html (consulted 26/7-10). 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notion of exclusion was associated with a broader sense of citizenship and the blocking of 
individual’s opportunities to exercise social, political or civil rights, the conceptualization of 
exclusion in post-Maastricht Europe was clearly linked to an economic understanding where labor 
market participation was seen as a precondition for inclusion (p. 17 ff.).  
 
Related to this debate is the discussion concerning the OMC’s political and instrumental design 
where scholars have questioned its contribution to EU policy-making. For example, Salais (2007), 
questions the novelty of the OMC’s policy ‘toolbox’ arguing that it largely has been adapted and 
borrowed from New Public Management. Recognizing the method as a social technology of 
knowledge the author argues that statistical tables, social indicators and guidelines should be seen 
as descriptive tools constructing normative discourses stipulating institutions’ way of perceiving 
social ills and subsequently how to deal with these. Thus, the OMC transforms politics into a 
“process of maximising quantitative performance” where the creation of “an environment of 
procedures of information and of evaluation adequate to predefined political goals (ultimately, a 
system self-producing proofs)… leads to growing difficulties to articulate legitimate alternative 
claims” (Salais 2007: 4, 17). The perception that the OMC is an a-political or neutral policy-
instrument capable of promoting any sort of policy constitute, according to Kröger (2009b: 12), a 
rather naïve assumption about politics and, as Lascoumes and Les Galès (2007:4) points out: 
“Public policy is a sociopolitical space constructed as much through techniques and instruments as 
through aims or content. A public policy instrument constitutes a device that is both technical and 
social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, 
according to the representations and meanings it carries”. Thus, in this view, the OMC represents a 
political instrument through which the construction of ‘Social Europe’ is conducted according to a 
neo-liberal conception of society.  
 
Furthermore, Schäfer (2006:84), in a comparison between the OMC and similar soft-law 
coordination mechanisms in the IMF and the OECD, questions the asserted effectiveness of the 
method and argues that: “Multilateral surveillance is not primarily chosen for its effectiveness but 
for its capacity to facilitate compromises, substituting substantial agreements for procedural ones”. 
The lack of legal follow-up potentially creates a culture in which Member States manipulate the 
philosophy of soft-law circumventing the process and thus, ultimately making it ineffective. In line 
with this, Alesina and Perotti (2004: 8) furthermore argue that the OMC seem to put governments in 
a “bad Nash-equilibrium in which a withdrawal would qualify them as Euro-villains”. In addition, 
they argue that the Lisbon process has “set back the level of the debate and understanding by the 
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public by giving the impression that some EU institution actually knows how to solve the problem of 
European unemployment, if only national governments cooperated” (Ibid). On the other hand, if the 
method would turn out to be effective it would, as Duina and Taipo (2007) points out, raise several 
questions of accountability since national parliaments are not consulted in the OMC process. As the 
OMC is not processed according to traditional procedures of scrutinizing EU-legislation, national 
parliaments find it harder to ‘get a grip’ on the method (p.493). Thus, national administrations may 
use the OMC in the ‘two-level’ game (see above) to increase a form of ‘deparlamentarization of 
national politics’ (p. 491). Finally, Hatzopolous (2007) in his article discussing ‘Why OMCs are not 
good for Europe’, argues that the spreading of OMCs may actually worsen the EU’s legitimacy 
problems. Thus, the lack of policy output associated with the OMC may impair the EU’s credibility 
contributing to the already negative idea that Europeans have of the EU. Therefore, according to the 
author, “it is hardly surprising that, in the political arena, the most frequent supporters of the 
OMCs happen to be quite unenthusiastic about European integration” (p. 318). 
 
So, to answer the question above, the problem with the OMC, as implied by this critical review, is 
that: 1) the method, as incorporated in the Lisbon strategy, does not necessarily constitute a genuine 
attempt to place social policy at the frontline of European integration but has also been 
conceptualized as a ‘Trojan horse’ filled with neo-liberal orthodoxy 2) the notion of the OMC as a 
‘neutral’ policy instrument is not necessarily ‘true’ since it does not take into account the ways in 
which policy instruments may ‘frame’ political reality 3) the OMC may not be as ‘new’ as we think 
since it largely rests on ‘old’ mechanisms of policy coordination which means that one could 
question its added value in creating a more accountable and transparent EU where its 
‘experimentalist’ approach to democracy may result in less democratic outcomes than preceding 
approaches to policy-making in the EU. With these caveats in mind, I will continue with a review of 
current research concerned with the OMC’s legitimacy and effectiveness. 
 
2.3.2 Legitimacy 
As mentioned above, the OMC has been praised by its advocates for its potential democratic 
qualities where the ambition to include a range of different actors of the European multi-level polity 
has been seen as a solution to the faltering legitimacy of the EU. Thus, the method’s ability to 
enhance legitimacy and participatory policy-making has been given much attention. Analyses of the 
OMC’s legitimacy usually depart from theoretical conceptions of deliberative democracy and 
participation subsequently using them as yardsticks in empirical orientations studying the method 
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on EU and national level (Borras & Conzelmann 2007). Studies focusing on the EU level highlight 
the logic of decision-making in committees concerned with establishing OMC guidelines, largely 
concentrating on the degree and quality of actor-participation. De la Porte and Nanz’s (2004) 
empirical study of the OMC on employment and pensions at EU-level show that the method does 
not live up to its democratic ambitions. They draw on three different approaches to deliberative 
democracy: 1) a procedural theory of deliberate democracy derived from Habermas emphasizing 
that decisions should be made on the basis of adequate information through a transparent process in 
which the different interests involved have equal weight 2) deliberative supranationalism focusing 
on the political deliberation through a top-down perspective emphasizing the degree of deliberation 
in expert committees rather than stakeholder participation 3) directly deliberative polyarchy 
emphasizing the importance of bottom-up participation for the effective outcome of decisions (p. 
269-271). Through these approaches five normative criteria are developed assessing the OMC’s 
potentially democratic qualities: transparency, public debate, participation, learning and 
responsiveness. Their overall conclusion, using these criteria, asserts that the OMC is neither 
transparent nor open for participation where the process seem to remain “centralized and top-down 
rather than de-centralized and bottom-up” (p. 284). On the other hand, the authors argue, 
legitimacy (as defined in their article) seem to differ somewhat between policy fields both 
according to its institutionalization at EU-level (i.e. employment having a closer relation to the 
treaty than social protection and social inclusion) as well to actors own participatory interests in 
certain policy fields. However, comparing ‘new’ modes of governance (OMC) with ‘old’ 
(Community Method), Stijn Smismans questions the legitimacy of the OMC showing that it may 
well be even more closed than ‘hard-law’ policy-making calling it an ‘Open Method of 
Centralisation’, i.e. centralizing the definition of policy choices to the EU-level and being ‘open’ 
not in the sense of actor participation but rather in the form of unpredictable policy outcomes (2004: 
17). Thus, Smismans warns that “one should be very reluctant in arguing that new modes of 
governance are characterized by their particularly democratic participatory nature. More 
horizontal and heterarchical governance does not mean automatically more participatory 
governance in normative democratic terms” (2006: 19).  
 
Domestically based studies generally assess the method’s subsidiarity ideal and to which extent 
NGOs and other relevant actors participate in the drafting of the NSRs. Often using similar 
methodological approaches these studies show a more differentiated picture of the OMC’s 
democratic capacity where national institutional settings and political traditions is an important 
variable for the degree of legitimacy and participation. The field of policy also affects the ways in 
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which the integration of the method is processed at the domestic level. As Jacobsson (2005) shows, 
in her study of the OMC on employment and social inclusion in Sweden and Denmark, the degree 
of actor inclusion (which in a comparative perspective is moderately high) differ between policy 
fields. Whereas the EES includes the domestic social partners on a regulatory basis (in line with 
political tradition) in the drafting of the NSR, civil society actors are only included on an ad hoc 
basis denominating their role to contributors of information. In the field of social inclusion 
however, social partners are not participating (mainly due to their focus on industrial relations) and 
NGOs have a more important role, although still on an ad hoc basis (p. 130). In Germany the degree 
of participation is relatively low where the drafting-process of the NSR is mainly dominated by 
bureaucrats (Friedrich 2006). The German political system challenges the OMC’s democratic 
ambitions where the ‘Länder’-structure duplicates the procedure of the method and makes 
participation problematic (Ibid). Thus, as Büchs and Friedrich (2005) conclude, without a stable 
political anchorage within Germany’s social and employment policy-making structures (i.e. both at 
the Bundesrat and Länder-level) the OMC’s integration will be restricted to ‘surface integration’ of 
interest only to a few political elites. In Britain, Armstrong (2005) has found that the participatory 
dimension of the OMC on inclusion correlates both with: 1) the devolution of the public system 
which have resulted in the development of specific sub-regional strategies and partnerships, which 
are not necessarily interested in the OMC process 2) the amount of European funding associated 
with the method where organizations and sub-regional actors have focused more attention to the 
Regional and Social funds. In Italy, Ferrara and Sacchi (2005) show that although the OMC has had 
a moderate effect building national ‘institutional capabilities’ in the field of employment, it has 
been relatively insignificant affecting participation in policy-making. The absence of domestic 
commitment on social inclusion has furthermore led to an insignificant inclusion of non-state and 
regional actors (p. 163, 166). 
 
In sum, the degree of legitimacy and participation of the OMC-process at the domestic level seems 
to correlate with 1) the diversity of Member State’s institutional political legacies and structures 2) 
non-state and sub-national/regional actors own interest in the process (which is also true for the EU-
level). This is an observation which clearly emphasizes the argument put forward by Smismans, i.e. 
that one should be cautious about equaling ‘new modes of governance’ with democratic and 
participatory decision-making since the complex institutional and political reality of both the EU 
and Member States challenge the normative ambitions of the OMC. 
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2.3.3 Effectiveness 
The OMC has been entangled in a broader political debate concerning the significance of ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ modes of governance in the construction of ‘Social Europe’ (Trubek & Trubek 2005). Thus, 
the approach’s effectiveness has been a central point of research. Existing literature draws heavily 
on theories of Europeanization (see above) and is generally concerned with when, why, how and to 
what degree the OMC affects Member States? (López-Santana 2009: 134). The focus of interest has 
been the method’s ability to pool knowledge through actor-participation, to create ‘opportunity 
structures’ for actors in the EU- and domestic political arena as well as to enhance learning and to 
diffuse policy orientations among the diversity of Member State’s institutional arrangements 
(Jacobsson 2005; Ferrera & Sacchi 2005; Kröger 2007). The main challenges for researchers have 
been to capture, measure, interpret and theorize manifestations of influence where the absence of 
established variables and analytical frameworks through which to asses the method has caused 
some general scholarly confusion. As in the case of legitimacy, case studies indicate that influence 
is neither unidirectional nor uniform but rather reciprocal and to some degree correlating with 
institutional settings as well as other endogenous and exogenous processes (Visser 2009). Recent 
empirical studies (see Heidenreich & Zeitlin et al. (2009)) also indicate a less deterministic notion 
of influence where the ‘yardsticks’ measuring influence have gone from the search for direct 
regulatory effects to more subtle and indirect policy adjustments. Some of these studies also casts 
doubt on the usefulness of the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis (Hamel & Vanhercke 2009: 105 ff.). 
 
Thus, a clear example of a more constructivist ‘lean’ in the study of the OMC is a recent chapter by 
López-Santana (2009) who presents the idea of ‘ideational fit’ through which she argues that the 
dependent variable assessing the influence of the OMC is ‘internalization’. In her study of Belgium 
Spain and Sweden, she asserts that while the OMC (in this case the EES) does not lead to radical 
change, the method may ‘inspire’ policy-makers or ‘frame’ policy discourses in an early stage of 
the policy process which can lead to incremental procedural and cognitive adjustments in 
subsequent stages. According to the ‘ideational fit’, influence will be manifested differently across 
Member States. Thus, it is hypothesized that countries with low ideational misfit will internalize 
soft law less than countries with medium or high misfit. In the case of Belgium and Spain the author 
asserts that although the EES did not lead to direct radical changes in domestic labor market 
policies, governments and social partners have since 1997 created programmes, legislation and 
collective agreements that in many ways match the principles and objectives promoted by European 
guidelines (p. 143). In the case of Sweden internalization has been less manifest since policies 
already showed a low degree of misfit. Thus, in conclusion, the author argues that the EES has had 
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an implicit effect on Belgian and Spanish labor market policies, particularly through problem 
identification, agenda setting and policy formulation where the OMC is conceptualized as an 
‘opportunity structure’ “that pushes policy makers to update their belief systems and to reform (or 
strengthen) their welfare policies, programmes and institutions” (p.149).  
 
Hamel & Vanhercke (2009) furthermore, in the study of the OMC/SPSI in Belgium and France, 
presents four mechanisms through which the OMC, in their view, may exert procedural or 
substantive alterations of domestic policies, politics or polity: 1) through creative appropriation 
where rational actors use the OMC in creative ways as a ‘leverage’ legitimizing their preferences 
and agenda criticizing officials and demand increased participation in governance 2) by spurring 
socialization and discursive diffusion where actors, by using the cognitive content of the OMC 
incorporate terms and ideas into national debates 3) through mutual learning where policy-makers 
through ‘mirror effects’ and comparative monitoring may increase their awareness of other 
solutions which may be used, implicitly or explicitly, in the domestic sphere 4) through external 
peer pressures where benchmarking and other types of rankings may influence actor’s beliefs or 
actions (p.85). Furthermore, by hypothesizing that the influence of the OMC also should be seen as 
related to the ways in which actors have, or have not, been able to influence the EU-decision-
making process, i.e. the idea that the amount of ‘uploading’ will correlate with the likeliness of 
subsequent ‘downloading’, they add a further dimension to the process of influence. Their findings 
(based on stakeholder interviews) show that the OMC has caused procedural as well as substantive 
shifts in both Belgium and France. Thus, according to the authors, the OMC spurred a ‘culture of 
monitoring’ in both countries. Furthermore, in Belgium, the OMC increased the vertical and 
horizontal interaction between authorities and regions causing intra-regional learning (a noteworthy 
effect considering the autonomy of regions in Belgium). The authors also assert that the OMC has 
caused substantive shifts in France and Belgium, both political and cognitive. Firstly, the OMC 
spurred actor inclusion (more so in Belgium than France) where actors appropriated the method 
using it as a lever for inclusion. Secondly, the OMC pushed child poverty as a policy priority in 
both countries (although more explicitly in Belgium) diffusing established discourses of poverty and 
policy-procedures, e.g. greater decentralization of policy-discussions. Furthermore, external 
pressure was not felt ‘soft’ at all where actors perceived the EU, in the case of child poverty, as 
strongly pushing them to develop indicators, targets etc. (p. 105-107). In conclusion, the authors 
argue that the OMC may be more effective than has been asserted. In their view, the OMC may 
work independently of Member States initial uploading success. For example, Belgium, already 
having a large fit with EU-requirements concerning actor inclusion, further strengthened NGO 
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involvement. This casts doubt on the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis where actors appropriation (however 
small the misfit may be) of the OMC may be used to push their agenda and where the time between 
uploading and downloading may cause unintended consequences resulting in outcomes which not 
necessarily can be understood through a misfit/fit approach (p. 107-108). Thus, the authors argue 
that domestic effects are not preconditioned by the institutional setting: “On the one hand different 
institutional settings lead to similar effects …” (e.g. OMC creating a ‘culture of monitoring’ in both 
countries even though having dissimilar starting positions) and  “On the other hand… similar 
institutional settings may lead to different effects” (e.g. OMC leading to a high degree of actor 
participation in Belgium but not in France) (p. 108). 
 
However, while the above examples mirror a rather positive idea of the OMC’s effectiveness as 
subtly leading to a Europeanization of domestic social policy, Kröger (2009b), in her study of the 
OMC/SPSI in Germany and France, draw very different conclusions about the method’s virtues. 
She argues that the OMC thus far has scored ‘dramatically low’ (however, lower in Germany than 
in France) because its main mechanism of learning and monitoring does not work where “The short 
answer to this phenomenon is that the weak institutional architecture (of the OMC) did not work in 
favor of learning, and the architecture was too weak because member states wanted it to be weak” 
(p. 208). Thus the absence of an independent monitoring agent, the non-coerciveness, the 
insufficient information, absence of clear rules as to what qualifies as ‘good practice’, the lack of 
precision of what should be learned etc. all seem to disqualify the OMC as an effective policy 
instrument (Ibid). Thus, it is naïve to think that the OMC, without sanctions or precise information, 
will be properly integrated into the domestic institutional structure where “The point is that the 
assumption of learning has been de-contextualized from the larger institutional environment(s) in 
which it is supposed to happen, and that the embedding institutional structures in which actors are 
supposed to learn are not necessarily supportive of supranational learning processes“(p. 208). 
Thus, the OMC seems to be a case of ‘soft governance in hard politics’ (Kröger 2008b). This notion 
of the OMC’s moderate effects and Member State’s ambivalent attitude toward the method is 
affirmed by Vifell (2009) who, in the case of the EES in Sweden means that the national 
administration is speaking with ‘forked tongues’ when accommodating the OMC-process in the 
domestic arena. Thus, while the OMC have had some effects on the administration’s organizational 
work where Sweden have to act according to formal EU-requirements (e.g. draft a NSR) to be seen 
as a legitimate actor, EU-influence of Swedish labor market policies is not seen as legitimate in the 
domestic arena which means that when dealing with these conflicting demands, the national 
administration ‘de-couples’ the OMC from national policy-making where the OMC is separated 
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from national policy-making. Thus, while the national administration reflects a legitimate way of 
solving problems to the EU, they maintain ‘business as usual’ behind the scenes (p. 5).  This point 
is important since it highlights the intricate relation between legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
OMC. Accordingly, since the OMC does not enjoy legitimacy at the domestic arena it is not 
implemented properly, which in the end leads to deficient effectiveness. 
 
Thus, drawing on the above examples, one could possibly conclude that: 1) the OMC does not 
necessarily conform with the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis where actors appropriation, time and 
uploading/downloading misjudgments etc. may lead to unintended outcomes 2) that the literature on 
the OMC’s effectiveness differ widely according to the ‘lense’ through which it is studied where a 
constructivist approach may portray a more optimistic outlook for the OMC’s effectiveness while a 
more rationalist approach shows a more moderate effect where Member States in different ways 
secularize the process (i.e. looking at the OMC in relation to ‘hard politics’ indicates a relative 
insignificance of the method while highlighting informal and incremental adjustments portray the 
method as implicitly effective). 
 
2.4 The OMC/SPSI in Sweden 
Provided with the above discussion regarding the complex nature of Europeanization as well as the 
differentiating examples of how and under what circumstances the OMC may affect the national 
political arena, it is important to sketch out some distinctive characteristics of the Swedish political 
system in order to understand in what context the method operates.  
 
2.4.1 Sweden as a political and organizational culture 
Thus, while Sweden is often characterized as a centralized political system it also has clear 
corporatist features with a long tradition of cooperation between organized labor (LO/TCO) and 
capital (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise12). The social partners have a privileged position in 
social policy-making through the institutionalized tri-partite decision-making structure (i.e. 
collective decision-making between the government, labor organizations and employer 
organization). NGOs, the voluntary sector and other civic organizations without clear relation to 
industrial relations have not, in a historical perspective, resided the same position in policy-making 
processes (Rothstein 1992). Since the 1990s, the Swedish regions and county councils enjoy a high  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degree of independence, taxation rights and are responsible for public services and thus have a 
central role in the distribution of resources in the social sector (Garpenby 1992; Blomqvist 2004; 
SOU 2000:1: 136-159). The Swedish welfare state is often classified, along with its Scandinavian 
neighbors, as a ‘social democratic’ welfare regime following Esping-Andersen’s typology (1990). 
Although, the welfare system underwent a crisis during the 1990s, it can still, in a comparative 
perspective, be seen as a country with high public expenditure resting on universalism and de-
commodification of social rights where the state plays a central role in carrying out active market-
correcting policies.  
 
2.4.2 Introducing the OMC in Sweden 
The introduction of the OMC/SPSI was received with skepticism as public officials as well as 
NGOs largely regarded its policy-content as incongruous with the principles of Swedish welfare 
(Halleröd 2003: 6). Thus, the OMC/SPSI have had a very marginal impact where the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, which is responsible for the drafting of the NSR, has been less enthusiastic about 
including European guidelines as yardsticks in the domestic policy orientation. Instead the NSR 
largely reflects domestic policy goals. However, for social NGOS, as Jacobsson and Johansson 
(2009) argues, the OMC/SPSI has functioned as a clear lever. In their view, the method was an 
‘important catalyst’ mobilizing a loosely coordinated network, called the Network Against 
Exclusion (Nätverket Mot Utanförskap - henceforth NMU), consisting of a range of social 
organizations. The NMU, according to the authors, used the OMC to pressure public officials in the 
process of inclusion where organizations with a clear link to the EU, such as the European Anti 
Poverty Network (EAPN), played a significant role in informing other organizations about the 
participatory dimension of the OMC even before public officials had knowledge about the process. 
Subsequently, in 2003, the government established a ‘Committee of Users’ (Brukardelegationen – 
henceforth CU) - a regularly consultative forum between public officials and social NGOs. The CU 
accommodates 12 delegates from different social NGOs, one respective representative from the 
Swedish Association of Regions and County Councils (SKL) and the Ministry of Social Affairs as 
well as one public official from the Swedish Board of Health and Welfare. The Committee does not 
include the social partners, which is due to their limited interest in the process being mainly 
occupied with issues of employment. Thus, in Jacobsson and Johansson’s view, the OMC/SPSI has 
indirectly contributed to new patterns of institutionalized cooperation and consultation (186 ff.). 
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2.5 Analytical assumptions and why perceptions matter 
The above (see 2.1-2.3) given theoretical framework will be used in the analysis and discussion of 
the results. However, to provide a general overview of the political structure in which the 
OMC/SPSI operates I have constructed a figure (see below). 
 
 
  
Figure 2.5 The OMC/SPSI, policy processes and domestic mediators 
Inspired by Bache (2008: 19) and López-Santana (2009: 134). 
 
While the figure does not clarify the aspects of the OMC’s legitimacy or effectiveness, it does say 
something about the possible ways in which the method makes it way into the domestic arena. 
Thus, by emphasizing the complex interrelation between EU processes, domestic politics and other 
domestic or non-EU processes (i.e. the ‘two-level’ dimension and the ways in which other 
endogenous and exogenous may influence this ‘game’ of uploading and downloading) and the ways 
in which domestic mediators may/may not appropriate the method either by themselves or together 
(i.e. either through the CU or in a group outside this domain) creating different forms of influence 
in the domestic arena. While the limits of this figure is, as in the case of the figure above (see figure 
2.1), that it neither elucidates the ways in which unexpected consequences of the ‘two-level’ game 
may affect subsequent influence nor accurately explain the complex interactions between actors in 
the multi-level polity (i.e. top-down), it may serve as a comprehensive model in which to overview 
the OMC/SPSI-process in Sweden. 
 
2.5.1 Why perceptions matter 
The OMC/SPSI has largely gone unnoticed in the public debate where the Committee can be seen 
as one of the few manifestations of the method in Sweden. Thus, since the OMC/SPSI largely 
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depends on this semi-formal governance practice, the ways in which its members perceive, enact 
and make sense of the process (Horvath 2009) is decisive for the potential of the OMC/SPSI as a 
policy-instrument, both concerning legitimacy and effectiveness. Consequently, this study is limited 
to the focus of Committee member’s perceptions of the OMC/SPSI. While perceptions can tell us 
something about the potentials of the OMC, the thesis does not suggest that the process solely 
depend on actor’s perceptions. Other endogenous and exogenous factors should also be seen as 
contributing to the dynamics of this complex process. However, as both legitimacy and 
effectiveness, especially due to the process non-coercive character, is heavily dependent on actors 
behavior, perceptions is interesting to study since it may orient the ways in which they make sense 
and subsequently enact in relation to the OMC.  
3. METHOD 
3.1 Research design and choice of respondents 
According to the aim of this study a qualitative approach was chosen to explore the perceptions of 
the respondents (Kvale 1997; Esaiasson et al. 2007: 284 ff.). Hence, fifteen semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with twelve different respondents during the period between March and 
June 2010. The first selection of actors/representatives was based on their centrality in relation to 
the OMC process at the domestic level. Since there are only a few public officials handling the 
OMC/SPSI-process in Sweden these interviewees could be distinguished rather easily through 
websites and public documents. One official chairing the discussions in the CU was very helpful 
and sent both contact details to all NGOs in the Committee as well as meeting-minutes. Maximal 
variation (Esaiason 2007: 291) was given naturally through the Committee of Users (CU) since 
they are elected on the basis of their specific area in the social fields. Thus, the organizations ranged 
from large established, and sometimes international, umbrella organizations with extensive funding 
from either the government or the EU to smaller domestically based organizations with fewer 
resources and often a more specific agenda. While the first attempt finding members of the CU was 
rather uncomplicated, the case concerning NGOs outside the CU was rather intricate. While the 
NMU had some available documents containing contact details these tended to have a rather short 
‘best before’ date since the rotation of people in the NGOs (as I discovered) were rather high. 
Furthermore, since the NMU is, as a respondent stated, is ‘a network in its true meaning’, finding 
out who to talk to and which person(s) who had anything to say about the OMC was a rather 
daunting task. Thus, some interviewees were contacted by e-mailing/calling the central office (in 
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the case the organization had one) whereby I was redirected to the person(s) 
involved/knowledgeable with the OMC. Although all the organizations who responded were more 
than helpful with providing interviewees, the search for the ‘right’ person was rather time-
consuming often taking several telephone calls/e-mails where I more often than not ended up 
without an interview. However, when the search was successful, an appointment for the interview 
was set up and an e-mail with question themes sent to the interviewee in advance. Over thirty 
NGOs were contacted. Five organizations declined responding that they knew too little about the 
process to be able to contribute to the study. Eleven respondents accepted the request and were 
interviewed by telephone. One respondent were interviewed in person. The remaining organizations 
did not respond. One explanation to this rather low degree of response, as noted above, could be 
seen as related to the generally low interest/knowledge in/about the OMC. The length of the 
interviews varied between half an hour to one hour. Some interviewees were contacted twice. This 
was so since I recognized that I had to complement some of my earlier interviews with further 
queries as my own knowledge and understanding of the dynamics of the OMC in Sweden 
increased. Notes were taken during the interviews, which were subsequently transcribed. 
 
3.2 Analysis and caveats 
The analysis process was informed by content analysis (Krippendorff 2004). After conducting 
eleven interviews, the material was read through as a whole several times to grasp the different 
aspects emphasized by the different respondents. The next step was to identify similarities and 
differences in statements. Subsequently meaning units were identified and at first organized 
according six broad themes; 1) Legitimacy 2) Participation 3) Deliberation 4) Effectiveness 5) 
Learning 6) Usage. In the next step, the themes were categorized under the study’s theoretical 
framework and focus, i.e. legitimacy and effectiveness. This was a demanding process were the 
where the meaning units were sorted and re-sorted several times. As I discovered, the category 
‘effectiveness’ contained statements which in many cases were correlating with a rationalist or 
constructivist standpoint.  
 
One problematic caveat, which I wish to address before engaging in the results, is that when using 
content analysis the researcher is given a very central role in constructing and interpreting the data 
(Krippendorff 2004). The researcher tends to become a ‘torchbearer’ in the complex dynamics of 
the phenomenon of the study. Furthermore, in this study, information about the OMC/SPSI has 
been scarce. Thus, any manifestation has been of interest where, as I explained above, deriving 
   26 
information sometimes has been a true ‘hunt’. This has entailed an intricate balance between 
narrowness and distance in the interpretation process. The point of argument is that the interviewees 
with little or nothing to say about the OMC constitutes as much of a result as those with more 
familiarity and experience of the method. Related to this has been the difficulty to interpret which 
role one should give the OMC and potential effects in the domestic arena. The influence of the 
OMC is not tangible in the Durkhemian sense as ‘social facts’. Rather it is constituted through 
highly complex, and often socially dependent processes where other factors may well play a crucial 
role in the possible outcome. Thus, a challenge has been to constantly put the OMC in perspective 
to other potentially parallel processes to be able to make sense of the method’s possible effects. 
4. RESULTS 
The perceptions expressed by the different respondents mirror a polysemous image of the 
OMC/SPSI in Sweden. Although the method is generally seen as a rather illegitimate and 
ineffective instrument of interest only to a few, several statements also indicate ways in which it 
does matter. Perceptions expressed have been categorized into two broad dimensions; legitimacy 
and effectiveness. Legitimacy largely relates to actor’s receptiveness of the method as well as 
actor’s experience participating in the CU and the drafting of the NSR, i.e. do organizations 
participate in the drafting process in an active or passive way? How much political effort is invested 
in the report? Should discussions in the CU be characterized as deliberate or as mere bargaining? 
 
The second dimension, effectiveness, relate to actors’ perceptions and experience with the OMC as 
a political instrument enhancing learning processes, i.e. does the OMC have any effect on policy 
discourses or policy outcomes, either implicitly or explicitly? Effectiveness also relates to the ways 
in which actors ‘make use’, or not, of the process translating it into political action (Jacquot & Woll 
2003, 2010). Thus, the questions highlighted by effectiveness is both whether the OMC offer 
resources, strategic or cognitive, which enhance/legitimize political action to destabilize existing 
power structures enabling actors to reinvent their role in the political game and how actors perceive 
these processes. Which actors that are able/unable or are interested/uninterested of making use of 
the OMC and why this is so? Perceptions of the OMC’s effectiveness correspond with the 
dichotomy between rationalists and constructivists found in the Europeanization literature and has 
therefore been categorized into these two dimensions. 
 
As a final caveat it is important to note that the two categories, legitimacy and effectiveness, should 
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not be seen as exclusive but rather as interactive and occasionally overlapping. The usefulness of 
separating the terms lay both in the way different aspects of the OMC process are emphasized as 
well as in the way the material becomes more comprehensible.  
 
4.1 Legitimacy  
The perceptions of legitimacy of the OMC/SPSI among the respondents interviewed, both 
governmental and non-governmental, is low or very low. The process seems to be of interest to a 
few public officials and NGOs and the method have largely gone unnoticed in public debates. An 
issue of concern among both officials and NGOs is the low degree of transparency at EU-level 
where a majority perceives guidelines and requirements coming from Brussels as illegitimate. Thus, 
while the idea of stakeholder participation enjoys support, guidelines, monitoring and bi-annual 
reporting through the NSR is not a matter of priority for the CU. Public officials express least 
confidence in the method. Larger organizations with a European or international profile are more 
receptive of the OMC and generally express a more positive attitude concerning opportunities 
attached to the method. However, several respondents perceive the method as ‘toothless’, unable to 
initiate any change in policy outcomes and few organizations perceived the method as more than 
leverage for participation. Moreover, statements from NGOs also indicated somewhat of a changed 
attitude toward the method. Thus, during the OMC’s first years of existence, much expectation was 
invested in the method, especially among NGOs, seeing it as a potential leverage for stakeholder 
participation.  However, as time has caught up with the method, actors involved seem to have 
recognized the obstacles encumbering the OMC’s theoretical promises where several interviewees 
conceived it as cheap talk. As one NGO-representative explains: ‘Some saw the OMC as the 
invention of the wheel when it was introduced, rather than a continuation of other strategies to fight 
different social problems’. Another NGO-respondent clearly expressed a growing lack of 
confidence in the method: ‘The expectations of the OMC were grand, but people have been 
disillusioned... People were positive about the initiative and thought it would change something. 
Now, people are critical that nothing happens’. Thus, while many NGOs were (and still are) 
positive about the idea of participation, the lack of output or available resources associated with the 
method seem to have dampened much of the early enthusiasm. Furthermore, while the majority of 
NGOs included in the CU generally expressed a positive view on their own participation, few 
associated the CU’s work with the OMC. As one respondent explained: ‘Few organizations even 
know what the OMC really is. The OMC is only used as a label. It is comfortable for the 
government to use these organizations to provide data to the NSR but also because it looks good to 
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the EU’. Another NGO representative furthermore expressed concerns about the OMC’s 
undemocratic character since the national parliament is not included in the process: ‘The method 
does not have any democratic legitimacy. If anything is to happen, the parliament have to be 
engaged, something which does not seem probable in the near future’. A public official saw the 
OMC as a mere construction created by the EU and clearly underlined the national character of 
social policy. The CU’s work on social policy, the official explained, neither considered EU-
guidelines nor foreign NSRs in its discussions: ‘Had it been agricultural policy, the EU would have 
been much more present. Now we are talking about social policy which is a national concern. The 
Committee of Users is a good way to handle the OMC, where the organizations can help with the 
Strategy Report’.  
 
Perceptions concerning participation in the CU and the drafting of the NSR differ widely according 
to actors and time. Public officials perceive the CU as a forum for communication and exchanging 
ideas giving input and legitimacy to decisions. NGOs generally see the CU as a way of channeling 
the interests of their constituency to policy-makers. Although a majority of NGOs regard their 
participation in the CU as meaningful, few seem to associate the work in the committee with the 
OMC or EU-politics at all. Both public officials and NGOs state that the CU seldom or never 
considers the EU in policy discussions. While the OMC seem to have had a legitimizing effect on 
the idea of participation, the CU is now seen as predominantly occupied with (sub-)national 
politics. As a public official explains: ‘There was a direct connection between the OMC and the 
inauguration of the User Committee and a wish to fulfill the goals of the method… Now the User 
Committee works as an agency of consultation giving information and input to policy-makers’.  
Attitudes among NGOs toward the CU seem to have changed over time where several statements 
indicate a more mutual understanding between all actors involved. However, although the majority 
of organizations consider the atmosphere in the CU as deliberate stating that discussions are open 
and, for the most part, mutually considerate, some perceive discussions as more or less 
‘constrained’ where large organizations and officials dominate discussions. One NGO respondent 
saw the CU as a mere continuation of partisan politics in which, according to the respondent, many 
organizations pursued their own political agenda rather than engaging in constructive discussions. 
Several NGO respondents also point to the CU’s hierarchical power structure where the government 
largely controls both the agenda as well as access to financial resources. Although an appendix 
produced by the Network Against Exclusion is attached to the NSR, NGOs are not included in the 
actual drafting of the report. As one NGO respondent puts it: ‘The government want results and 
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outsources rather than listens to the organizations. The NSR is like a window for the EU to make us 
(Sweden) look like ‘good Europeans’. It is a product of the government and does not reflect the 
views of the organizations or the parliament’. On the other hand, many NGO respondents 
(including the latter one) underline the value of the CU where access and building relations with 
policy-makers are seen as important. For a conclusion of actors’ perceptions of the OMC/SPSI’s 
legitimacy see the figure below. Statements have been categorized in plus (+) and minus (-) 
indicating the attitude toward the OMC/SPSI concerning legitimacy. 
 
Figure 4.1 Actor’s perceptions of legitimacy 
 
4.2 Effectiveness 
According to a majority of respondents, the OMC/SPSI do not enhance policy learning in the form 
of explicit policy outcomes. Social policy is generally, according to the larger part of both 
governmental and non-governmental respondents, not seen as an issue to be exposed to extensive 
EU scrutiny where many express a wary attitude toward the idea of policy learning such as 
embodied in the OMC, i.e. through benchmarking and best practice. As one respondent explained: 
‘The OMC started out as a ‘name and shame’ process, but no one wanted to have it that way. It 
became a world championship, which, in my opinion, was not very effective… Although I think the 
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idea of cooperation is good, no one seems to look beyond their own policies’. Public officials do not 
experience much ‘adaptational pressure’ stemming from the OMC and the fact that the CU does 
not consider foreign NSRs and, as mentioned above, neither prioritizes the domestic drafting 
process could be seen as an expression of the marginal role of the process. Furthermore, the NSR, 
which until 2006 was referred to as the National Action Plan, is not an ex ante document on future 
social policy ambitions reflecting EU-guidelines but rather an ex post report on national initiatives. 
As a public official explains: ‘The NSR is not a “progressive” document. It is drafted every other 
year and reflects, as you can see, much of the same objectives as the (Swedish) budget’. 
Furthermore the official explained: ‘If we “learn” something, it is generally through our neighbors 
Denmark, Norway or Finland and not through the OMC’. 
 
However, several NGOs expressed a feeling of an increased presence of EU-politics in the domestic 
social policy discussion. Conferences, workshops, the EU’s year against poverty and exclusion 
(2010) and Sweden’s chairmanship (2009) were seen as important opportunities to demonstrate the 
importance of their own organization, to infuse traditional policy discourses with new perspectives 
as well as to spread knowledge about the idea of participation among other NGOs. For example, 
one NGO respondent meant that the discussion surrounding the actual definition of the term ‘active 
inclusion’ at the Roundtable discussions in November 2009 in many ways forced both organizations 
and public officials to ajar established preferences and consider new perspectives and strategies to 
reduce exclusion. Furthermore, while some NGOs perceived the EU’s year against poverty and 
exclusion as mere window-dressing, providing little additional resources for their work, some 
meant that the initiative also had an effect on the rhetorical tone of political elites: ‘Suddenly, Maria 
Larsson13 talks about the importance of cooperation. We did not have that kind of talk a couple of 
years ago’. Another NGO respondent confirmed this perception adding that the year against 
exclusion in many ways pressured officials to show their commitment to reduce poverty thus 
incrementally binding them to further cooperation in the future: ‘Official statements and reports 
bind up politicians in different ways. This can be used (by organizations) to pressure the 
government to include actors and so on’.  Another NGO-respondent saw the Swedish chairmanship 
as a breakthrough concerning the relation with the government: ‘The government needed the 
organizations during the chairmanship and acknowledged the organizations in a different way than 
before’’.  
                                                         
13 Minister of Eldercare 
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According to respondents, the ‘political usage’ offered by the OMC in Sweden mainly seems to be 
apprehended by NGOs through the idea of participation where the method has been used as a 
leverage for the NMU arguing for inclusion. Important to note, when discussing the political usage 
of the OMC, is that perceptions differ widely among organizations. For example, while some 
tended to see the OMC as having a clear effect on the developments leading to the establishment of 
NMU and the subsequent establishment of the CU, others saw the method as having a relative or 
insignificant importance highlighting other endogenous factors. As a respondent explained: ‘The 
Network Against Exclusion was not created out of a vacuum of EU-perspective but rather as a 
forum for domestic social NGOs… few organizations even knew about the OMC in 2000’. 
Regarding the CU, three NGOs stated that the OMC was of important strategic use when pressuring 
the government to be included in policy discussions. In general larger organizations with a clear 
EU/international link expressed greater knowledge about the OMC as well as a more confident 
attitude toward the possibilities of using the method to realize stakeholder participation. 
Domestically based and, in general, smaller organizations either did not have much to say about the 
OMC or saw few possibilities in materializing the OMC into political action. As a respondent from 
a nationally based NGO replied to the question of what use one could make of the OMC: ‘I have 
heard about it (OMC)… I know about the participation element and all, but apart from that I really 
do not see what we (the organization) can do with it’. One explanation to the low degree of usage, 
according to the respondents, is the lack of financial resources associated with the method. The link 
between the OMC/SPSI and the European Social Fund, according to one respondent, was too weak 
in comparison with the EES: ‘There are no real financial resources associated with the OMC 
(meaning OMC/SPSI). It is rather uninteresting for organizations in their struggle to survive 
financially’. The few financial resources associated with the OMC where organizations with ‘big 
muscles’ (as one respondent expressed it) are predominant. Thus, the method did not in any 
significant way affect the hierarchical inter-relation between NGOs. For a conclusion of actors’ 
perceptions of the OMC/SPSI’s effectiveness see figure below. To outline a general picture, 
statements have been categorized in a rationalist-constructivist divide. 
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 Figure 4.2 Actor’s perceptions of effectiveness 
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5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
The main findings of this study indicate that the OMC/SPSI scores rather low concerning both 
legitimacy and effectiveness. The OMC/SPSI’s lack of legitimacy is reflected through its low 
degree of institutional integration which seem to be restricted to ‘surface integration’, of interest to 
a few officials and a handful of NGOs. Furthermore, the OMC plays a very marginal role in the 
day-to-day work of the majority of both NGOs and public officials where the process seems to have 
been de-coupled from national policy-making. While NGOs are included in policy discussions and 
granted to attach an appendix to the NSR they are not involved in the actual drafting process. The 
fact that the CU does not consider foreign NSRs or European guidelines in their discussions, that 
few NGOs associate the work in the CU with the OMC and that officials explicitly stated that the 
method did not orient discussions also indicates a low degree legitimacy. This lack of integration of 
the process may be explained by seven interrelated reasons: 1) the lack of transparency at the EU-
level makes guidelines and targets appear illegitimate 2) the non-coercive character creates a 
perceived absence of external pressure 3) the perception that social policy is not an issue for EU-
scrutiny furthermore makes the concept of the OMC/SPSI illegitimate in the domestic arena 4) the 
OMC/SPSI is perceived as selective and not in line with Swedish welfare principles making other 
channels of learning more relevant 5) the vagueness of guidelines and targets seem to make actors 
perceive the method’s added value in policy discussions as limited 6) the lack of resources 
associated with the method makes it uninteresting for NGOs perceiving the social dimension as 
insincere 7) the national parliament is not consulted making actors perceive the process as 
secularized in national politics. 
 
The lack of legitimacy also affects its effectiveness. Although some actors do state that new terms, 
such as ‘active inclusion’ have occurred, extensive learning does not seem to be enhanced by the 
OMC/SPSI. Instead other channels are emphasized as more important. Since the CU does not 
consider foreign NSRs and do not seem to have been established as a European ‘mirror’ for policy-
makers but rather a sounding board for domestic state and non-state actors, mutual learning may be 
restricted to an intra-domestic exercise. While the clearest influence of the method in Sweden can 
be characterized as a ‘leverage effect’ where actors through appropriation of the OMC could 
legitimize their preferences and claim inclusion in policy discussions, it does not seem able to attain 
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more political ground than that (thus far?) – something which is reflected through the dampened 
enthusiasm among NGOs. Indeed, the actual ‘cost’ of including actors is rather low since 
organizations are not granted any mandate in policy-making. Although actor participation indicates 
a form of influence of the OMC one could question the actual role of the method in this 
development since devolution in Sweden has been underway since the 1990s. Parallel process, such 
as an agreement between civil society, the regions and county councils and the government 
established in 2008 also indicates that this is a wider societal transformation of governance not 
necessarily to be associated with the OMC. Furthermore, the OMC/SPSI does not seem to affect the 
inter-hierarchical relation between NGOs where larger organizations are still predominant and 
where resource distribution is differential. The lack of resources does little to invigorate smaller 
organizations where a majority of NGOs expressed either a lack of interest or knowledge about the 
method. Thus, the ‘political usage’ offered by the method seems restricted to leverage for 
participation. However, the results also indicate ways in which the OMC matters in the domestic 
arena and indeed, depending on the ‘lense’ applied when studying the OMC, the role of the method 
may be seen as divergent. Thus, the increased ‘presence’ of EU-politics may infuse discussions 
where new concepts and policy discourses may implicitly frame policy-makers belief systems and 
thus lead to incremental adjustments according to a European paradigm. The fact that some of the 
delegates in the CU chair positions in both the domestic arena as well as at EU-level could 
furthermore reduce the perceived distance between European and national policy-makers where 
some organizations may assume the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ which could open for further 
influence.  The work in the CU is generally perceived as positive in which actors express a mutual 
trust which, over time, may lead to increased intra-domestic learning and where influence might 
shine through the ‘gates’ of the state. However such assertions is bound to be tentative and as 
statements indicate, the attitude toward OMC/SPSI has actually become less enthusiastic which 
implies a rather uncertain future for the method in Sweden.  
 
Furthermore, the results of this study also cast some doubts on the usefulness of existing 
Europeanization theories. While the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis is helpful in understanding the ways in 
which influence may make its way into the domestic arena, its explanatory virtues may be limited in 
the case of the OMC/SPSI. For example, the ‘ideational misfit’ between the OMC/SPSI and 
Swedish welfare principles of universalism may be characterized as medium or high where policy-
makers perceive it as selective. This would imply high external pressure and some form of 
adjustment. However, officials do not seem to experience any extensive pressure to conform and 
none of the respondents indicated any policy adjustments related to the OMC. While this may be 
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due to actors failure to register implicit adjustments while being ‘in the moment’, the point is that 
while the ‘goodness of fit’ thesis assumes that influence is either one-way or, through its 
refinements, at least reciprocal, it becomes misleading in the case of the social OMC because 
Member States have too many ‘veto points’ to make this balance unequal. Since the EU lack (or 
have a vague) treaty-base in these areas of social policy and since these areas are par excellence 
associated with high resource (fiscal) redistribution and electoral sensitivity, Member States are 
likely to manipulate or weaken the process to avoid external pressure. Thus, the process is highly 
dependent on Member States political will which implies that the ‘goodness of fit’ may not matter 
since domestic acceptance is low and authority over EU pressures high. Thus, existing theories of 
Europeanization should, as a ‘softer’ approaches to European integration emerges, be 
complemented where the domestic arena to a larger extent is put in the spotlight. 
 
Furthermore, the results also point to a wider problematic with the OMC/SPSI where one, as voices 
propagating to make the process ‘stronger’ becomes louder, could question the idea of a social 
OMC as contra-productive, in as sense, placing governments in a ‘bad Nash-equilibrium’, which in 
the long run only hurts the credibility of the EU itself. Indeed, as this study indicates, attitudes 
toward the OMC/SPSI have been dampened where the early enthusiasm seem to have been replaced 
by a form of perception of the EU’s campaign for a ‘Social Europe’ as cheap talk. Furthermore, by 
stirring up too much political friction, the ‘two-level’ game between the EU and Member States 
may avert attention from the actual problem (i.e. that European states are in a continuous state of 
fiscal austerity) which would only result in a waste of time and resources. On the other hand, the 
uncertainty of ‘uploading/downloading’ and the mere presence of a social OMC may put social 
issues on the agenda thus highlighting the consequences of negative integration. The OMC/SPSI is 
a dynamic process, still in its infancy, and over time it may lead to a further reorientation of social 
policies. However, even if the OMC/SPSI may be effective subtly infusing national welfare 
paradigms, policy-makers should be cautious about its potential outcomes as well as its way of 
framing social issues. Indeed, if the process is made stronger it could potentially undermine the 
national power balance between administrations and the parliament. Since the experimentalism of 
the OMC, at this time, does not include national parliaments this would raise serious questions 
about accountability. Furthermore, as has been pointed out, the OMC has thus far been rather 
underconceptualized where the notion of the process as an ‘unidentified political object’ prevails. 
Scholars know too little about what type of policy outcomes may be enhanced by the OMC since it 
has been around for such a short period of time. Elaborating public policy is a political exercise and, 
as has been pointed out, the way in which the OMC as an instrument and as a social technology of 
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knowledge may tie up policy discourses to the EU’s economically oriented agenda may make 
alternative explanations illegitimate - making the method far from neutral. It is thus important that 
scholars are not blinded by the asserted novelty of the process since it, as pointed out above, to a 
large degree rests on ‘old’ tools. Thus, equaling ‘new’ modes of governance with democracy and 
deliberation is quite misleading since dropped down in political reality its theoretical virtues may 
play out differently. However, important to note, this should neither be seen as true for all OMCs 
nor for the OMC/SPSI in all European countries. The OMC may, as have been shown in other 
countries, indeed lift important issues to the agenda causing both procedural and substantive shifts 
where policy-makers experience the process as improving domestic social policy. Thus, conclusions 
in this study are limited to the OMC/SPSI in Sweden and should not be seen as indicating the end 
of the OMC’s political career. Too much political capital is invested in the method at this point, and 
the OMC will most probably prevail where attitudes toward the process may alter. However, in the 
further study of the OMC, it is important that the complexity of the OMC as a political instrument 
is recognized where scholars should identify the role of underlying competing ideas and 
conceptions in the construction of ‘Social Europe’ before assuming that this process actually 
reflects a genuine or consistent image of the ‘social’. 
 
5.1 Questions for further research of the OMC in action 
As have been indicated in this thesis, the empirical map of the OMC in action is far from fully 
explored and scholars need to develop reliable methodologies and variables through which the 
‘nature’ of the method can be understood. Considering that the OMC in many ways rely on political 
will rather than judicial coercion, a closer study of actor-interactions on both EU and national level 
is crucial in furthering the understanding of the method. Sociology is somewhat of a latecomer in 
the OMC research but can contribute with valuable insights to the ways in which the method affects 
or is affected by different actors in the European multi-level polity. Kassim and Le Galès’ (2010) 
‘instrument approach’ (which is a development of Lascoumes and Les Galès’ (2007) article (see 
above)) is one interesting example which can be useful in exploring the ways in which the OMC, as 
an instrument, may affect domestic power structures. Indeed, as the authors argue:  “approaching 
the EU through an analysis of how instruments are chosen, how they develop and how they are 
operationalised poses new questions and promises to shed new light on old debates about EU 
decision-making, policy change and the interaction between the actors involved in EU policy. The 
resources mobilised in the use of instruments, the conflicts that they provoke in their design and 
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deployment, as well as the eﬀectiveness of their implementation and enforcement, and their 
consequences, institutional, administrative, territorial and distributive, are all potentially 
significant objects of study to which an instruments-centred approach may add greatly to existing 
knowledge and understanding” (p.2). 
 
Furthermore, national studies of the OMC should to a larger extent focus on the regional application 
since, as in the case of Sweden, much of the actual social policy action is administered locally. 
Thus, differing local constellations (both meaning the representation of domestic political party’s 
and their relation to NGOs as well as their interest in the EU14) may create diverse 
opportunities/constraints for the method’s operationalization and influence. Another important 
aspect for the future for the research on the OMC is to investigate how institutionalization at EU –
level may affect the method’s legitimacy and effectiveness at national level. The EES, which have a 
clearer treaty base, more funding associated with it and thus a rather high institutionalization at EU-
level, has been more successful and to a larger degree integrated/accommodated by Member States 
while the OMC/SPSI shows a lower degree of actor receptivity. Thus, studying this relation may 
tell us something about what ‘ingredients’ that results in a more or less successful recipe for an 
OMC. 
 
Finally, while the research of the OMC continues to grow it is important that scholars apply 
methodological strategies that rightfully portrays the possible effects of the OMC. Zeitlin (2009: 
215 ff.) present three useful research strategies which may be used to overcome some of the 
methodological challenges in the study of the OMC: 1) contextualized process tracing whereby the 
practical influence of the OMC is assessed alongside a range of other factors in a national, sectoral 
and temporal context 2) triangulation of interview material within and between studies in order to 
offset bias and multiply points of observation 3) systematic comparison between findings across 
national case studies, policy domains and time periods to be able to trace general tendencies and 
dimensions of variation. In the future research of the OMC these methodological dimensions seem, 
in my view, to be crucial in order to truthfully color the empirical map of the OMC in action and to 
further explore the complexities of soft governance in European integration. 
 
                                                         
14 Berg & Lindahl (2007), for example, have showed, in their study of  Swedish regions and county councils, that the 
activity toward the EU-level differ widely around the country. 
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Appendix 1 - Interview guide NGOs 
 
-In your organization’s view, what links do you see between the OMC and the possibilities of 
political action in Sweden? 
-If any, how may you make use of the OMC in the domestic arena? 
-If none, why is that so? 
-In your organization’s view, what is the ‘goal’ of your participation in the Committee of Users? 
-How would you describe the ‘atmosphere’ in the Committee of Users? Are you able to make 
yourself heard in relation to policy-makers and officials? 
-Can you give any example of a policy outcome which is directly/indirectly linked to the work in 
the Committee of Users? 
-In your organization’s view, is there a consensus about how to organize social issues in the 
Committee of Users? 
- In your view, how much does the OMC or other EU-issues appear in the Committee of Users? 
-Since the start of your participation in the Committee of Users, has the work changed in any way, 
i.e. have new forms of cooperation, discussions or problem-solving mechanisms occurred? 
- In your view, is the work in the Committee of users going in any specific direction? 
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Appendix 2 – Interview guide public officials 
-In your view, what links do you see between the OMC and the inauguration of the Committee of 
Users? 
- What role does EU-policies/processes play in your day-to-day work? 
-If any, can you explain how? 
-If none, can you explain how? 
- What is the ‘goal’ with the Committee of Users? 
- What role does the Network Against Exclusion play in: 1) Swedish social policy 2) The 
Committee of Users? 
- What is the ‘added value’ of including NGOs in policy-discussions? 
- Can you give any example of a policy outcome directly/indirectly linked to the work of the 
Committee of Users? 
- How would you describe the ‘atmosphere’ in the Committee of Users? 
- Is there any examples of new terms, perspectives ideas in the discussion of anti-poverty policies 
which have been introduced since the introduction of the: 1) OMC 2) The Committee of Users? 
 
- In your view, how much does the OMC or other EU-issues appear in the Committee of Users? 
-Since the inauguration of the the Committee of Users, has the work changed in any way, i.e. have 
new forms of cooperation, discussions or problem-solving mechanisms occurred? 
- In your view, is the work in the Committee of users going in any specific direction? 
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APPENDIX 3 - SWEDISH SUMMARY 
Uppsatsen kartlägger statliga och icke-statliga aktörers uppfattningar om den öppna 
samordningsmetodens legitimitet och effektivitet inom området social trygghet och social 
delaktighet (OMC/SPSI) i Sverige. Resultaten är baserade på tolv semistrukturerade intervjuer, 
genomförda under perioden mars till juni 2010, med svenska statliga tjänstemän och icke-statliga 
organisationer med förankring både på nationell- och EU-nivå. Resultaten indikerar att OMC/SPSI 
har haft viss påverkan på den nationella kontexten som bidragande till en förstärkning av icke-
statliga aktörers roll i policydiskussioner, bl.a. genom skapandet av ett nätverk för organisationer 
inom det sociala området samt inrättandet av en s.k. Brukardelegation genom vilken statliga 
tjänstemän och intressegrupper har regelbunden kontakt och utbyter information. Utöver detta 
uppfattas dock OMC/SPSI som en marginell process i svenskt beslutfattande inom det 
socialpolitiska området där flera aktörer ser metoden som relativt illegitim och ineffektiv i sin 
nuvarande form. Socialpolitik uppfattas generellt som en nationell angelägenhet där metoden 
uppfattas som stängd och icke-transparent på EU-nivå vilket bidrar till en viss tveksamhet hos 
svenska aktörer gentemot riktlinjer och mål kommande från Bryssel. Bristfällig eller otydlig 
information kan också ses som en bidragande orsak till den låga nivån av integrering av metoden i 
Sverige där många organisationer och tjänstemän uttrycker en ambivalent uppfattning inför 
användningen av OMC/SPSI som policyinstrument. Den låga nivån av resurser kopplade till 
metoden är vidare en annan viktig orsak till den låga kunskapen/intresset hos organisationer att 
engagera sig i processen där andra vägar ter sig mer intressanta både för kunskapsutbyte men också 
för finansiering. Studien visar på en viss attitydförändring gentemot OMC/SPSI där mycket av den 
tidiga entusiasmen kring dess teoretiska möjligheter att skapa ett mer deliberativt beslutsfattande 
och bredare kunskapsutbyte verkar ha dämpats något. Dessa indikationer kan ses spå en oklar 
framtid för OMC/SPSI i Sverige. Samtidigt indikerar en rad uttalanden sätt som metoden, i 
kombination med en större ”närvaro” av EU i den svenska politiken, implicit spelar/i framtiden kan 
spela en större roll där nya begrepp och utökade kontaktytor utanför den nationella arenan kan ses 
som faktorer vilka potentiellt skulle kunna peka mot ett framtida inflytande. Sådana slutsatser kan 
dock endast se som tentativa där en rad faktorer måste vägas in i bedömningen av OMC/SPSIs 
eventuella inflytande. 
 
Avslutningsvis argumenteras för en fortsatt diskussion och utveckling av metodologiska 
tillvägagångssätt vilka kan kartlägga OMC legitimitet och effektivitet. Forskningen kring metoden 
är i akut behov av tillförlitliga variabler och metoder för att vidare fylla den empiriska lucka som 
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idag existerar inom forskningen. Sociologi pekas ut som ett viktigt perspektiv vilket kan bidra med 
nya insikter inom forskningsfältet. Forskningens fokus borde också i framtiden i större utsträckning 
fokusera på regioner och kommuners förhållande till processen för att undersöka huruvida 
metodens inflytande sträcker sig längre en till ett fåtål statliga tjänstemän och organisationer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
